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Several decades ago Professors Berle and Dodd began an interest-
ing debate.' Among other things, it concerned the nature of the share-
holders' relationship to large, publicly held corporations in which they
had invested and the responsibility of these corporations to groups such
as customers, employees, and persons residing in the communities in
which they operate. The debate has continued, drawing in other par-
ticipants and generating a diverse group of theories. After examining
current legal formulations of the shareholders' relationship to large,
publicly held corporations,2 and current concepts of corporate responsi-
bility, this Article will discuss some of these theories in light of empiri-
cal research done by the authors with respect to shareholders'
expectations. The Article will then present some of the authors' theo-
ries, which are based in part upon that research.
I. SHAREHOLDING AS OWNERSHIP: THE TRADITIONAL
CONCEPTUALIZATION
A. The Model's Basic Framework.
In the traditional model of the corporation, shareholders convert
their individual property into an equity share in the enterprise's collec-
tive capital.3 The corporation becomes an entity distinct from the natu-
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) [herein-
after cited as Dodd, Trustees].
1. See notes 77-78 infra and text accompanying notes 77-82 infra.
2. Since this Article will focus on the large, publicly held corporation, the authors will in
most cases forego the modifiers and speak simply of "corporations."
3. This contribution to capital by individual shareholders is both the event that entitles the
shareholder to benefit from the advantages of corporate organization, such as that of limited lia-
bility, and that marks the creation of the rights shareholders receive in return for their capital,
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ral persons who comprise its membership,4 and is regarded as a private
association organized for the mutual gain of its individual members.'
The entity, rather than the shareholders, owns the corporate property,
and this structure preserves the continuity of the venture regardless of
the ownership changes of individual shareholders.6 Nevertheless, the
corporation is still discernible as a collection of individuals who have
merely chosen to clothe their ownership of property in the legal guise
of the corporate form.' From the traditional legal standpoint, therefore,
the shareholder owns the corporation "in the proportion that his stock
bears to the entire stock.' 8
such as the right to profits in the form of dividends and the right to a proportionate share upon the
dissolution of the corporation. In the traditional ownership model it represents the actual purchase
of part ownership in the corporation. See United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States, 186 1. Supp. 724
(N.D.Cal. 1960), aft'd, 308 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1962) (contribution to capital and the receipt of
certain rights vir a vis the corporation by the shareholder in exchange); State ex rel Waldman v.
Miller-Wohl Co., 28 A.2d 148 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942) (corporation in fact an aggregate of individu-
als who share in the corporate equity); Brooks v. Eschwege, 108 Ohio App. 567, 162 N.E.2d 897
(1957) (stock in a corporation represents actual purchase of part ownership). See generally 18
C.J.S. Corporations § 6 (1939).
4. McCarroll v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp., 201 Ark. 329, 146 S.W.2d 693 (1941); Bird
v. Wilmington Soe'y of the Fine Arts, 28 Del. Ch. 449, 43 A.2d 476 (1945); Whitfield v. Kern, 122
N.J. Eq. 332, 346, 192 A. 48, 56 (1937). See also H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 108-09 (2d ed.
1970) for a concise discussion of the various entity theories.
5. Altoona Warehouse Co. v. Bynum, 242 Ala. 540, 7 So.2d 497 (1942); Dodd, Trustees
1146.
6. Chief Justice Marshall, in one of the earliest analyses in American law of the nature of a
corporation, emphasized that perpetuity of ownership is both the salient characteristic and raison
d'etre of corporate organization. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 636 (1819).
7. A business organization that utilizes the corporate form allows individual investors to act
as one for the purpose of transacting business. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1941);
State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wahl Co., 28 A.2d 148 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942). Normally, the law
will not attribute the acts of the shareholders to the corporation and vice-versa. In compelling
circumstances, however, corporations will be revealed as a mere aggregate of investors. By doing
away with the corporate veil in such cases, equity reminds shareholders that the corporate fiction
is actually a revocable privilege granted by the state. "Equity... disregards the corporate body
as a legal entity distinct from its members, and recognizes that while stockholders have no legal
title to the corporate assets, they are nevertheless the equitable owners thereof." Waller v. Waller,
187 Md. 185, 191, 49 A.2d 449,453 (1946). See also Whipple v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ariz. 1, 121
P.2d 876 (1942).
8. Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 595, 596 (9th Cir. 1931). See also
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (Hays, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1960). It was Judge Hays's contention that for the purpose of determining the existence of decep-
tion for a Rule lOb-5 violation, a showing that the directors, while fully aware of all material
information, withheld this information from "the real owners of the property with which the di-
rectors were dealing," that is, the shareholders, was sufficient to prevent a summary judgment
against plaintiff shareholders. On rehearing, Judge Hays wrote the court's opinion.
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The shareholder's ownership quite patently does not involve any
direct physical possession of, or right to decide the use of, the corpora-
tion's assets? He instead possesses a collection of incorporeal proprie-
tary rights relating to the corporation. 10 Shareholders are, for example,
entitled to profits in the form of dividends and to information as to how
the business is being conducted." They also have the right to insist that
management govern the corporation in the interest of all the sharehold-
ers, and particularly that management not waste assets nor apply them
for unauthorized purposes.'"
Despite these indicia of ownership, shareholders (by virtue of the
merger of their individual investment into the collective property of the
corporation) have parted with direct control over the uses of their indi-
vidual property.1 3 In the traditional model, actual control is wielded by
a board of directors that formulates long-term policy and exercises gen-
eral supervision, and by executives who implement board policy and
make day to day decisions in operating the enterprise.' 4
9. "In a sense, the stockholders of a corporation own its property, but they are not manag-
ers of its business or in the immediate control of its affairs." Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 115 U.S. 587, 597 (1885).
10. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1900); see Commissioner v.
Scateng, 85 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1936); Department of Treasury v. Crowder, 214 Ind. 252, 15 N.E.2d
89 (1939); Jay Ronald Co. v. Marshall Mortgage Corp., 265 App. Div. 622, 40 N.Y.S.2d 391
(1943), rev'd, 291 N.Y. 227, 52 N.E.2d 108 (1943).
11. Although, generally speaking, shareholders have the right to information and to inspect
corporate books, they do not have unlimited access to the books. Rather, they need a proper
purpose in requesting access, presumably to avoid undue shareholder meddling in management's
legitimate efforts to conduct corporate business. Normally, however, the burden is upon the cor-
poration to show an improper purpose. State ex rel.. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 18 A.2d 235
(Del. Super. Ct. 1941) (holding that the shareholder's right to inspect the books is absolute, unless
an improper motive is established by the corporation); accord, Hughey v. DuBois Press, Inc., 36
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
For cases discussing the general proposition that shareholders have a right to receive infor-
mation about the corporation, see In re Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1935);
DuPont v. DuPont, 42 DeL Ch. 246,208 A.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Bruun v. Cook, 280 Mich. 484,
273 N.W. 774 (1937).
12. Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940) (corporate of-
ficers are liable to shareholders under New York law for mismanagement); Baker v. Cohn, 42
N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modfed, 266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1943) (duty not to
waste assets is part of honest business management); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y.
285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
13. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 115 U.S. 587, 597 (1885). See Hethering-
ton, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corporate SocialResxponsibilty,, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 248, 250-55 (1969); Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8
(1965).
14. State corporation statutes and the Model Business Corporation Act vest the right to man-
age the business and affairs of the corporation in the board of directors, although the Model Act,
the Delaware statute and several other state statutes allow shareholders to limit this power in the
articles of incorporation. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 35 (1974); DEL. CODE
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A division between ownership and control15 is thus inherent in the
traditional corporate model as one of the costs of choosing the corpo-
rate form of doing business. Yet in this model, the shareholder's surren-
der of his proprietary prerogatives is not absolute, for he retains certain
basic protections. Perhaps the most fundamental is the right to elect
directors.' 6  It is assumed by the traditional model that shareholders
through the annual meeting have the power to require management to
account for their actions, and that they can show approval of manage-
ment decisions by re-electing the directors.' 7 Shareholders are also as-
sumed to have the power to replace the board with a new slate of
individuals who, hopefully sobered by their predecessors' fate, will be
better attuned to the shareholders' wishes. The right to elect directors,
in the traditional legal model, represents the shareholder's private right
to participate in the corporation's management and permits ultimate
control over the enterprise.'
A second complementary protection flows by necessity from the
practical problems of restraining managerial misuse of what is, in the
traditional model, assumed to be the shareholders' money.' 9 To pro-
vide this protection, the law treats directors not merely as the agents
ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). The case law elaborating on the
managerial powers of the board of directors and top executives is voluminous. See, e.g., Hausman
v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962); Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 42 Del. Ch. 348, 211 A.2d 610
(1965); Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956); Shonnard v. Elevator Sup-
piles Co., Ill NJ. Eq. 94, 161 A. 684 (Ch. 1932); cf In re Kaufman Mutual Fund Action, 479
F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1973) (discussing the allegations that a shareholder must make respecting the
conduct of corporate directors in order to bring a derivative action).
Of course, the traditional model does not reflect reality in these respects. Control is not typi-
cally wielded by the board of directors, and neither does the board usually formulate long-term
policy or exercise supervision, at least in the usual sense of that word. See, e.g., M. EISENBERO,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 139-48 (1976); M. MACE, DIREC-
TORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
15. The concept of the separation of ownership from control was articulated by Berle and
Means in describing what they considered to be the foremost characteristic of the modem corpora-
tion: the removal from shareholders and the vesting in management of the power to control the
corporation's activities. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 5 (rev. ed. 1967).
16. Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906). See also Bijur v.
Standard Distillation & Distrib. Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 546, 70 A. 934 (Ch. 1908).
17. State incorporation statutes have specified that the directors are to be elected by share-
holders and that no director may take office until he has been elected and qualified. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit.-8, §§ 141, 211 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:5-2, 14A:6-3,
14A:6-5 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703 (McKinney 1963).
18. Lee v. Riefler & Sons, 43 F.2d 364, 365 (M.D. Pa. 1930); Bijur v. Standard Distillation &
Distrib. Co., 74 NJ. Eq. 546, 70 A. 934 (Ch. 1908).
19. For an early complaint about management, see A. SMrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. V,
ch. I, pt. III, art. I (Campbell, Skinner & Todd eds. 1976).
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and instrumentalities through which the enterprise's business is carried
on, but as fiduciaries: "Directors of a corporation are trustees for the
stockholders, and their acts are governed by the rules applicable to
such a relation, which exact of them the utmost good faith and fair
dealing . ,, 20 Directors, "to whom law intrusts the power of man-
agement and control,"21 are governed by stringent rules of fiduciary
conduct which, as one court insisted, "rise far above the ordinary
morals of the marketplace." 22 The directors owe an allegiance to the
corporation "that is influenced in action by no consideration other than
[its] welfare."23 Some courts have admittedly distinguished the direc-
tor's fiduciary duty owed to the corporation on the one hand from pos-
sible fiduciary duties owed personally to shareholders on the other.24 In
this regard, however, it seems clear that management's fiduciary duty
to the corporation has in the traditiofial corporate model been thought
of as existing for the benefit of shareholders. 25
Finally, it is clear that the traditional concepts of ownership, albeit
adapted somewhat to fit the corporate entity, form the major analytical
tool used by courts in settling shareholder/corporate disputes. In these
situations, protection of the shareholders' ownership interest is para-
20. Lofiand v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 389, 118 A. 1, 3 (1922). For other cases discussing
directors' and other managers' fiduciary duties, see generally Guft v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5
A.2d 503 (1939); Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 13 Del. Ch. 120, 115 A. 918 (1922); Eliasberg v.
Standard Oil Co., 23 NJ. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Super. Ct. 1952); Stephany v. Marsden, 75 N.J.
Eq. 90, 71 A. 598 (Ch. 1908).
21. Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 296, 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (1906).
22. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65,77 (10th Cir. 1967) (quoting Wooten v. Wooten, 151
F.2d 147, 149 (10th Cir. 1945)). The Sixth Circuit in Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939),
rather pointedly stated the rationale underlying the stringent standards of fiduciary duty that man-
agement must observe: "[S]o many artificial legal devices have been set up which serve to isolate
the stockholder from control over his investment that directors and other officers of a corporation
should be held to a strict accountability for their acts in its management." Id. at 91.
23. Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 356, 369 (1942). See also Elliott v. Baker,
194 Mass. 518, 523, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (1907). It is also worth noting that a number of courts,
presumably due to their general protectiveness over shareholders' perquisites of ownership, have
extended these fiduciary standards to all persons, including other shareholders, in a position to
exercise control over the corporation. See, e.g., Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 372
F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. Del. 1974): "[O]ne who exercises control over a corporation which in turn
exercises control over a Delaware corporation may have a fiduciary duty to the latter corpora-
tion."
24. For an exhaustive study of directors' fiduciary duties, especially in relation to duties
owed to the corporation as opposed to those owed to shareholders, see Bayne, T7he Fiduciary Duty
of Management-The Concept in the Courts, 35 U. DET. L.J. 561 (1958).
25. Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303, 308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1942), mod#Fedin 318 U.S. 80
(1943). See generaly In re Westec Corp., 434 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1970); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rife,
381 F.2d 646 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); Lawrence v. I.N. Parlier Estate Co., 15
Cal. 2d 220, 100 P.2d 765 (1940); Angelus Sec. Corp. v. Ball, 20 Cal. App. 2d 436 (1937); Bingham
v. Ditler, 309 Ill. App. 581, 33 N.E.2d 939 (1941).
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mount, for the ownership model of the corporation has become axio-
matic in American law.2 6 Cases employing this analytical tool have
balanced the rights of shareholder-owners against management's need
for adequate compensation,27 distribution problems upon dissolution28
and recapitalization measures affecting shareholder voting power.29 In
these cases, the judiciary has frequently and vigorously defended the
concept of shareholder ownership. Consider, for example, the New
York Court of Appeals' affirmation of this principle in Stokes v. Conti-
nental Trust Co.:
What is the nature of the right acquired by a stockholder through the
ownership of shares of stock? What rights can he assert. . .? While
he does not own and cannot dispose of any specific property of the
corporation, yet he and his associates own the corporation itself, its
charter, franchises, and all rights conferred thereby .... 30
The Stokes case, and those like it, applied the protections derived
from the concept of ownership to reverse management decisions that
diluted shareholder voting power." More pertinently, for our purposes,
the conceptualization of shareholders as owners has supplied the philo-
sophical underpinnings for judicial elaborations of the proper goals of
the corporate enterprise, especially in cases where management has re-
sponded to the interests of groups other than shareholders. In modem
terms, these situations involve questions of corporate responsibility that
conflict with the shareholder's proprietary rights.
26. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252 (1922). The Court's opinion used
the term "axiomatic," in the context of a shareholder's right to participate in new stock issues, in
preference to strangers, to describe the principle holding that this right springs from the preroga-
tives given to the shareholders as proportionate owners of the old capital. The Court's reference
reflects the pervasiveness of the ownership model in American corporate jurisprudence. For other
examples of the use of this model, see note 8 supra and accompanying text.
27. See generally Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co.,
29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939), aft'dper curiam, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
639 (1942). But see Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
28. Neil v. Phinney, 245 F.2d 645, 651 (5th Cir. 1957); Chevron Oil Co. v. Clark, 291 F.
Supp. 552 (S.D. Miss. 1968), a.f'd in part, rev'dinpart, 432 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1970); Kirby Royal-
ties, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 461 P.2d 282, 283-84 (Wyo. 1969).
29. Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F.
Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Bates v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 206 F. 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1913); Snelling
v. Richard, 166 F. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
30. 186 N.Y. 285, 295, 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (1906).
31. For cases using a rationale similar to that of Stokes in discussing shareholder voting
rights, see Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F.
Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917
(1930). As the Stokes court ruefully admitted, the purpose of this protectiveness is to safeguard
the shareholders' power to select directors, which is "about all the power" they have. Stokes v.
Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 296, 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (1906).
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One of the earliest case precedents, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,32
dealt strongly with management attempts to consider in decision mak-
ing a constituency broader than shareholders. In Dodge, Henry Ford's
expansionist corporate notions and zeal for selling his cars to the public
at a price they could afford, but at the expense of maximum profit
levels, clashed with the expectations of Ford's shareholders.33 The
Michigan Supreme Court sided with.the irate shareholders. It bluntly
asserted:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-
distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.
Management may conceive that it owes a duty to the public, but, ac-
cording to the Dodge decision, it must not confuse its enlightened ideas
with its established duties to shareholders-the only duties this court
was prepared to recognize.35 In terms of its factual situation, Dodge
stands virtually by itself. Most other cases dealing with questions of
corporate actions that conflict with shareholder proprietary rights have
involved corporate charitable contributions or employee benefit pro-
grams.
B. Charitable Contributions and Employee Benefts:
The Corporate Benet Rule.
Shareholders have in some well-known cases asserted their prerog-
atives as owners, charging that a particular charitable contribution or
course of action was ultra vires, a waste of assets and/or a breach of the
corporate managers' fiduciary duty. Courts initially agreed with them,
32. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
33. As the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized in its opinion, Ford Motor Company had
just concluded the most profitable year in its history. Henry Ford, however, persuaded the board
not to vote any special dividends despite the enormous surplus, but rather to use the cash to
expand the company's capacities by constructing its own smelting plant to produce steel for its
cars. He further determined that, because the company was making such a great profit, he would
reduce the selling price of Ford cars in order to share the company's profits with the rest of the
public. The plan's "apparent immediate effect," the Michigan court noted, "[would] be to diminish
the value of shares and the returns to shareholders." Id at 504, 170 N.W. at 683.
34. Id at 507, 170 N.W. at 684. Although the court criticized Henry Ford's actions as unnec-
essary and improper philanthropy, it hesitated to halt Ford's plans for expansion. As Dodd noted,
the court may have limited its decree from its conscious or unconscious reluctance to interfere
with the growth of a socially important enterprise. Dodd, Trustees 1157-58 n.31.
35. 204 Mich. at 459, 170 N.W. at 668.
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discouraging managers, to borrow Lord Justice Bowen's metaphor
from Hutton v. West Cork Ry ,36 with cakes-and-ale notions. Out of the
Hutton case, a strict common law rule developed prohibiting corporate
charitable activities unless a direct benefit accrued to the corporation.37
Like most strict rules, the direct benefit rule proved difficult to live
with, both for courts and for management. Enlightened recognition of
corporate self-interest, fueled by pressures from the idea of good public
and employee relations, began to take root in judicial philosophies. 38
Gradually, the strict "direct benefit" rule was liberalized in order to
allow charitable and other activities if they served corporate ends in a
substantial sense.39 In an early and leading case on this question, Stein-
way v. Steinway,4" the New York Supreme Court upheld company
plans to build an employee town complete with a school, a church and
a library, on the basis that these actions were taken for the benefit of
the corporation.4' By no means, however, did the Steinway court in-
tend to broaden the direct benefit rule so as to allow corporate actions
which benefited persons other than shareholders, as the Michigan
Supreme Court reminded the defendants in Dodge.42 In the latter case,
the court recognized a difference in degree and kind between a merely
"incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds," 43 as found
in Steinway, and "a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the
36. [1883] 23 Ch. 654. Almost one hundred years ago, Lord Justice Bowen articulated the
early common law standard against which corporate charitable activities should be measured:
"The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale
except such as are required for the benefit of the company." Id. at 673.
37. West Cork Ry has, in fact, remained the leading case articulating the narrow direct
benefit test limiting corporate charitable and other philanthropic activities. The English Chancery
Court, in the context of compensation of directors, ruled that because any money spent belongs to
the corporation, the expenditure must procure some benefit required for the well-being of the
company. See id at 671, 673.
38. In People ex rel Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N.Y.S.
649 (1909), the New York appellate court discussed both the philosophy of enlightened corporate
self-interest and good employee relations. The State of New York charged in this case that the
defendant corporation had violated state insurance laws in connection with its purchase of real
estate to build an employee tuberculosis hospital. Although corporations still use the enlightened
self-interest doctrine to justify social efforts, their justifications have become increasingly sophisti-
cated. See Blumberg, Corfporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REV. 157 (1970).
39. Greene County Nat'l Farm Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank, 57 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Ky.
1944), al'd, 152 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 834 (1946); Evans v. Brunner,
Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359.
40. 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (1896).
41. Id at 47-49, 40 N.Y.S. at 720-22.
42. 204 Mich. at 506-07, 170 N.W. at 684. The Dodge defendants argued that Henry Ford's
plan to reduce the selling price of Ford cars constituted a benefit to the corporation similar to
those permitted by the Steinway doctrine.
43. Id at 506, 170 N.W. at 684.
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expense of others.""
Over the years numerous courts found benefits to the corporation
and, ultimately, to shareholders, via tenuous connections between cor-
porate advantage and the particular activity involved. For example,
they permitted corporations to build employee tuberculosis hospitals,4"
to donate to business schools,4 6 to participate in a business organization
dedicated to uncovering deceptive business practices47 and to cancel
farm debts in an area dependent on a healthy farm economy.
4
C. The Old vs. the New: A.P. Smith and Its Progeny.
Several more recent decisions have examined the argument in
favor of legally recognizing a corporation's wider responsibilities apart
from those resulting from actions creating corporate benefit. All have
decided to uphold the particular action that has been attacked by
shareholders. But in emphasizing improved employee attitudes or cor-
porate public-spiritedness, the courts have subtly built a case for a find-
ing of benefit. Questions of shareholders' ownership fights are rarely
mentioned, though one senses that the use of the benefit test as at least
partial support for a decision constitutes a judicial obeisance to the
ownership concept.
In many respects, the first judicial recognition of corporate respon-
sibility to a group other than shareholders is still the most liberal. In
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,49 the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld a donation to Princeton University by the defendant cor-
poration. The court asserted that the donation could be justified solely
as the company's recognition of its responsibility to the community. It
indicated, however, that the corporation benefited from the gift in a
very broad sense: its actions would aid its long run survival in a free
enterprise system.50
The Delaware Chancery Court in Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson,5I a case involving a corporate contribution to a tax-exempt
44. Id at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
45. People ex rel Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N.Y.S.
649 (1909).
46. Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
47. Better Business Bureau of Detroit, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 296 Mich. 513, 296 N.W. 665
(1941).
48. Greene County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank, 57 F. Supp. 783 (w.D.
Ky. 1944).
49. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
50. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
51. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
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foundation, cited the New Jersey court with approval and warned that
"[u]nless corporations carry an increasing share of the burden of sup-
porting charitable and educational causes. . . the business advantages
now reposed in corporations by law may well prove to be unacceptable
to the representatives of an aroused public. 52
Few other courts have gone as far. Most have labored to find a
corporate benefit to uphold a corporate charitable act. In Kely v.
Bell, 53 for example, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld the making
by U.S. Steel of payments in lieu of taxes to a Pennsylvania county in
which it did business on two grounds: responsibility to the community
and corporate self-interest. The agreement to make such payments was
conditioned on the passage of a law providing for a phasing out of the
taxes (based on the value of machinery) that the payments replaced.
The court indicated that the phasing out of the taxes would improve the
depressed economic conditions in the county by encouraging industrial
development, and that the addition of new industries to the county's
tax base would ultimately ease U.S. Steel's tax burden. The corporation
also benefited because, under the agreement, payments would not be
made with respect to newly acquired machinery, although, under the
old law, such machinery would have been added to the tax base.
Though the plaintiff shareholders, suing derivatively, thought the pay-
ments a waste of corporate assets, the court disagreed. The payments, it
said, "were made with a recognition of Steel's responsibility to the com-
munities in which it was established and of its self-interest in having
[the tax phase-out legislation] remain unaltered on the statute books. ' 4
In a similar manner, the Second Circuit applied New York law to
test New York Telephone's contribution to a public-interest group that
publicized views the company shared on a bond referendum relating to
public transportation: "To the extent that NYT's contribution was
prompted by a concern for the state of transportation and the multi-
plier effects on the economy as a whole it is protected [by statute]." 5 In
addition, the court noted that, to the extent the contribution was
prompted by an appreciation of the business benefits to be derived
from better transportation, the corporate benefit rule also protected the
contribution.5 6
52. Id at 404.
53. 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969).
54. Id at 74.
55. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 854 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum addressing a claim by
plaintiffs of ultra vires).
56. Id
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Occasionally a court's attempt to achieve the "correct" result and
maintain the traditional attitude towards shareholders produces a
rather curious hybrid. One example is the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Herald Co. v. Seawell,7 which involved a shareholder's objections to a
gift of shares to an employee stock option plan created by the Denver
Post. The court acknowledged that it was "fully cognizant of the well-
established corporate rule of law which places corporate officers and
directors in the position of fiduciaries for the stockholders. Basic in that
rule is the profit motive of the corporate entity. 581 Corporations that
publish newspapers, however, are different; their duty, said the court, is
more than profit making. Because their goal is to inform the public,
they are a type of public institution with a duty to shareholders, em-
ployees and the- public.5 9 Thus, if the corporation had to devote its at-
tention to employees in an industry usually beset by labor troubles in
order to ensure that the news reached the public, shareholders could
not object.60
Even in these rather narrow lines of cases, recognition of manage-
ment's right to consider groups other than shareholders when making
decisions continues to be qualified. Without statutory change or some
groundbreaking case precedent to guide them, courts can be expected
to adhere, in differing degrees according to the philosophies of the
judges, to old notions of shareholder supremacy.
It should be mentioned that a majority of state legislatures have
passed corporation statutes expressly allowing corporate donations for
charitable and other "public welfare" purposes.6' Several have
progressed so far as to state that donations may be made "irrespective
of business benefit. '62 It is tempting to construe these provisions to
cover corporate activities other than charitable contributions in their
ordinary form. To do so, however, would strain actual legislative in-
57. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
58. Id at 1091.
59. Id
60. The appellate court's opinion subtly weaves both the public benefit and the newspaper's
interest in the form of reduced labor strife to form the rationale supporting the case's result. Id at
1095. In an interesting contrast to the Tenth Circuit's findings, the district court noted a less altru-
istic reason for the complained-of gift of shares to the stock plan trust fund: the major stockhold-
ers were attempting to ward off a take-over by a large newspaper chain. Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315
F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970).
61. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 1977); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(g) (1975);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 450.1261(k) (West 1973); TaX. CORP. & ASs'Ns tit. 32, 1349 (Vernon 1962);
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(m) (1974).
62. See, eg., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12)
(McKinney 1963).
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tent, which seems to have been simply to codify the law of modem
cases." Also, it is questionable how courts view this type of statutory
authorization since they continue to pay homage to the requirement of
a corporate benefit.64
II. THE OWNERSHIP MODEL: THE VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE
To many observers familiar with the operations of today's corpo-
rations, the courts' continuing emphasis on the conceptualization of
shareholders as a corporation's owners is illustrative of the familiar ju-
dicial reluctance to relinquish old ideas.6 5 Even the sheer number of
shareholders has weakened the proprietary underpinnings of the corpo-
rate ownership model. A decade ago Berle noted that twenty-four mil-
lion Americans had invested in corporate shares, and a New York
Stock Exchange study showed twenty-five million American share-
holders in 1975.66 In addition, the only contact most individual share-
holders have with the enterprise they supposedly own is their dividend
check and a copy of the annual report. It is unlikely that a GM share-
holder, while on a factory tour, would believe he would be taking one
of "his" hubcaps if he picked up a replacement for his Pontiac.6 7
Changes in the patterns of share distribution have also weakened
the shareholder-ownership model. The profile of the average American
shareholder increasingly is not that of the white-collar worker investing
in shares for his old age. Financial institutions, such as banks and pen-
sion funds, possess a large and growing percentage of the equity in
American corporations. 68 According to the New York Stock Exchange,
63. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1963); comment to id. § 202(a)(12).
64. See generally cases cited at notes 45-57 supra.
65. More than one legal commentator has criticized the courts as well as legal reformers for
the continued focus on the ownership model as a drain on creative energy that could be better
utilized to find analytical tools that explain real-world corporate relationships. For a particularly
good analysis, see Hetherington, supra note 13.
66. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. LAW. 149, 150 (1968);
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 50 (1977). The figures provided in the FACT BOOK are
taken from the most recent NYSE study of the investment market, conducted in 1975. However,
the study revealed an actual decline in the number of shareholders, from a high of 30 million in
1970 to 25 million in 1975. Today, only one out of six Americans are shareholders, versus one out
of four in 1970. This decline has been attributed to the period of economic recession in the early
1970's that caused many smaller investors to leave the market.
67. See Kahn, Big Potato/or a.Day, THE NEW YORKER, June 17, 1950 at 65. For an inter-
esting comparison of the same shareholder's attitude twenty years later, see Kahn, We Look For-
ward to Seeing You Next Year, THE NEW YORKER, June 20, 1970 at 40.
68. In 1964, Harbrecht estimated this percentage as approximately one-third of the out-
standing shares of large industrial corporations. Harbrecht, The Modern Corporation Revisited, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1413 (1964).
[Vol. 1978:819
Vol. 1978:8191 NEW GUIDELINES FOR MAN4 GEMENT 831
institutions hold approximately one-third of the Exchange's list of
stocks.69 They currently rank among the largest shareholders in major
American corporations.7 0 In terms of the traditional conceptualization
of the shareholder's relationship to corporations, the actual "owners" of
many corporations are therefore shareholders of shareholders.7
1
The emphasis on marketability of shares, with an easy way out
provided by the stock market for the unhappy shareholder, and the
demise of the shareholder vote as an effective tool of management con-
trol have also done much damage to traditional concepts implicit in the
ownership model7 2 The weakening of the ownership model corre-
sponds to the rise in managerial power, which in turn raises such ques-
tions as: "For whom are the managers working?" and "Who is entitled
to partake in the wealth generated by corporate activity?" 73
Such questions are hardly new; they were first articulated nearly
fifty years ago by A.A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner Means in The Modern
69. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 53 (1977). This has held more or less con-
stant from 1970 to 1975. A more significant indication, however, of the growing predominance of
instututional shareholders is provided by a comparison of the relative numbers and the corre-
sponding dollar volume of shares traded by institutional and individual shareholders. In the First
quarter of 1976, an average of 44 million shares was traded daily on the NYSE. While the relative
proportions of this total attributable to institutional and individual trading are fairly close (57% vs.
43%), the proportional dollar volume of shares traded by institutions was much greater than for
individuals (excluding members trading on their own accounts): 70% to 30%. Id. at 56.
70. In a recently-released U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee study, 21 large
institutional investors were listed among the top identified voting rights shareholders of the 122
largest corporations, whose shares constitute 41% of the market value of all common shares out-
standing. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 22, col. 2. See also NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT
BOOK 50 (1977).
71. The prevalence of institutional shareholding means that more people in fact are relying
on shareholding as a means of private wealth, albeit indirectly, through their participation or
membership in financial institutions. But institutional shareholding also further removes the ac-
tual owners from any say in the use of productive property, and constitutes, in Berle's terminol-
ogy, a second layer of passive property-holding. Berle, supra note 13, at 14. See also Harbrecht,
supra note 68, at 1414.
72. The efficient stock market machinery has in fact probably hastened the demise of the
shareholder vote as an effective tool of control. Even though shareholders may be better informed
about their corporations due to SEC vigilance, they are less interested in directly interfering with
management and are much more likely to sell their shares than fight management. This attitude is
especially prevalent among institutional investors. Hetherington, supra note 13, at 280-85; W.
CARY, CORPORATIONs 238 (4th ed. 1969). Werner argues, however, that the market actually per-
forms a control function for shareholders; the importance of market price and marketability al-
lows shareholders to vote against management in the market by selling their shares. Werner,
Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L.
REv. 388 (1977).
73. Questions concerning the proper beneficiaries of corporate wealth have increasingly oc-
cupied the attention of both courts and legal scholars. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Hen-
derson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25 (E. Mason ed. 1960); Blumberg, supra note 38.
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Corporation andPrivate Property,7" the seminal work on property own-
ership and corporations. This work's central thesis focused on the sepa-
ration of ownership and control and on management's license to
operate the corporation as a "purely neutral technocracy," without an
enforceable responsibility towards shareholders, or any other group.7"
"Separation of ownership from control" became the central concept of
an entire literature examining the discrepancies between the "received
legal model"'76 of the corporation and its actual form. But this concern
also provoked a well-known debate between Berle and Dodd77 on the
issue of responsibility. For example, if power implies responsibility, to
whom is management responsible? If not solely to shareholders, then to
what other groups whose interests are affected by the corporation?
The Berle-Dodd dialogue centered essentially on the concept of
trusteeship as the means to enforce responsibility among management,
but with two contrasting applications.78 It was Dodd's belief that it was
undesirable
to give increased emphasis ... to the view that business corpora-
tions exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockhold-
ers .... [P]ublic opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made
and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of
74. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 15.
75. Id 312. The emphasis on technical competence has not only led to the professionali-
zation of management but, according to Galbraith, has created a substructure of technicians who
form a technostructure within the corporation that sets corporate goals in terms of growth but also
conditions corporate responses to external pressures. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE
(1972).
76. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 139-48.
77. This debate stretched over nearly forty years, through a series of books, law review arti-
cles, book reviews and speeches treating the concept of managerial trusteeship and corporate
responsibility. The principal works include: A. BERLE, THE 20T CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLU-
TION (1954); Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix (E. Mason ed. 1960);
A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 15; Berle, supra note 66; Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees:,A Note,
45 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement ofthe Fiduciary Duties o/Corporate
Aawagers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935); Dodd, Trustees, Dodd, Book Review, 9 U.
CI. L. REv. 538 (1942); Dodd, Book Review, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 782 (1933). For an excellent
analysis of this debate, see Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64
COLuM. L. REv. 1458 (1964).
78. Dodd warned in 1932 that there was a need for management to assume responsibility to
repair the damage to society caused by the collapse of American business, and he chose the famil-
iar concept of trusteeship to enforce this responsibility. Dodd, Trustees 1154-60. Berle on the other
hand, while he agreed with Dodd's basic analysis of wider corporate responsibilities, harbored a
profound suspicion of managements power and believed they could be trusted only with a re-
sponsibility to one group, namely shareholders. Berle, .4 Note, supra note 77, at 1371-72. Interest-
ingly enough, Dodd later modified his views concerning. managerial trusteeship, bringing them
closer to Berle's. Dodd, Book Review, 9 CHI. L. REv. 538, 546-47 (1942). See Weiner, supra note
77, at 1462-63.
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the business corporation as an economic institution which has a so-
cial service as well as a profit-making function....
According to Dodd, the institution of the corporation includes
shareholders, employees, customers and the general public. As
fiduciaries for the institution, managers in effect are trustees for those
groups who have an interest in and are beneficiaries of that institution
("client-groups").80 Berle sharply disagreed, insisting that the only
clear-cut responsibility for management was to shareholders, a duty
that the trusteeship concept already enforced."1
Despite their differences, Dodd and Berle both accepted share-
holder ownership as the working principle from which to develop their
theories on management's fiduciary duties. In fact, Dodd seemingly felt
obliged to portray the corporation as a socio-economic institution in
order to get around the legal obstacle raised by the "proprietary rights"
of shareholder-owners.
82
Bayless Manning, however, attacked even this basic assumption,
taking a hard look at how shareholders behave.83 He pointed out that
modem shareholders rarely behave like corporate owners: few attend
the annual meetings, important managerial proposals on mergers, op-
tion plans and the like are "virtually never rejected," and most share-
holder votes have little significance until needed by one side or the
other in a proxy fight.84 To Manning, the concept of ownership presents
the greatest stumbling block in designing appropriate remedies for the
real world. Manning's model would abandon this concept in favor of
one that posits that the "only thing shareholders own is their stock":
To view the shareholder as the owner only of a share of stock-as a
bondholder is said to own "the bond"-conforms far more closely to
the shareholder's own expectations and describes far more accurately
what he in fact handles as his own-buying, selling and giving
away.85
One of the consequences of this approach is that management would
have the widest discretion in business matters.86 It could legitimately
79. Dodd, Trustees 1148.
80. Dodd noted that business leaders have already adopted this attitude, citing in particular
the comments of Owen D. Young, President of General Electric, concerning his trusteeship for
those groups which have an interest in the corporation as an institution. Dodd, Trustees 1154,
1160.
81. Berle, A Note, supra note 77, at 1367-68.
82. Dodd, Trustees 1161-62.
83. Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE LJ. 1477 (1958).
84. Id 1487.
85. Id 1492.
86. Id 1491. Manning's model of the shareholder contrasts sharply with existing case law.
However, in a number of taxation cases courts have recognized the essentially risk-taking nature
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choose to attend to the wishes of a particular client-group after being
conceptually freed from the limits imposed by shareholder-ownership.
Managers would be relieved from the necessity of justifying their "cor-
porate good citizenship" or "pro-customer" decisions to shareholders
in order to protect themselves from legal objections.
The Berle, Dodd and Manning commentaries have provided a
literature that comprises a fairly substantial portion of the body of
scholarly legal writings on corporations.8 7 The topic of corporate re-
sponsibility has been frequently discussed throughout the activist years
of the 60s and into the 70s, especially with regard to the spectre of
increased government regulation hovering menacingly over the corpo-
ration.88 Most proposals urging more corporate responsiveness to the
enterprise's various client-groups blend Manning's observations with a
variety of techniques to enforce management's responsibilities: a two-
tier board, emphasis on market mechanisms, or a type of "good busi-
ness" rule that legitimizes the need for more responsiveness as the cost
of doing business in today's society.8 9 No legislature or court has, how-
ever, even come close to adopting any of these proposals.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REGARDING SHAREHOLDERS'
EXPECTATIONS
Neither in conceptualizing the relationship of shareholders to cor-
porations, nor in determining whose interests managers should con-
of shareholding as a decisional principle to determine whether sums of money taken in income or
deducted by a taxpayer were in the nature of loan interest or dividends. United States v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Richmond, 90 F.2d 971 (4th
Cir. 1937); Fellinger v. United States, 238 F.Supp. 67 (N.D. Ohio 1964), aft'd, 363 F.2d 826 (6th
Cir. 1966); Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
87. In addition to those works cited throughout this Article, perhaps the most complete treat-
ment of this subject may be found in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (E. Mason ed.
1960). For examples of commentary from other disciplines, see Kaysen, The Social Signicance of
the Modern Corporation, 47 AMER. ECON. RaV. 311 (1957); P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY
(1949).
88. Most commentators portray a dire cause-and-effect scenario of increased government
intrusion into corporate affairs if corporations remain unmoved by pleas for more social respon-
siveness. See Blumberg, supra note 38, at 163-64; Friedmann, Corporate Power: Government by
Private Groups and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155 (1957).
89. For one form of a two-tier corporate managerial structure, modeled along the lines of the
German system, see Conard, R§flections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 949-
57 (1977). European proposals have included a French proposal calling for an annual company
report on social activities by corporations and a British Conservative Party suggestion to allow
company managers to take wider considerations into account in decision-making. COMIT
D'ETUDE POUR LA REFORME DE L'ENTmEPRsE 204 (1975); Le bilan social dans les rapports des
sociitees c tes en 1975, BULLETIN MENSUEL DE LA COMMISSION DES OP-RATIONS DE BOURSE
7-8 (Dec. 1976); Dep't of Trade and Industry (U.K.), Company Law Reform 19-20 (1973).
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sider in decision making, have either courts or commentators focused
on the expectations of shareholders. Courts have simply adopted centu-
ries-old ideas about property ownership in coming to their formula-
tions, and commentators have basically focused on the need of society
for change. Yet shareholders' expectations are important to consider,
for if those who are to benefit from the traditional conceptualizations
and decision-making rules do not expect the benefits, either the concep-
tualizations and rules should change or a new basis for them should be
found.
With this in mind, the authors concluded that shareholders should
be asked questions which would determine two things: first, what their
perception was of the shareholders' relationship to the corporation, and
second, whose interests they felt should be considered in corporate de-
cision making. The authors accomplished this by means of a question-
naire completed by 466 shareholders of large, publicly held
corporations.90 For comparison purposes, we also administered the
questionnaire to 116 first-year Notre Dame Law School students who
did not own stock in this type of corporation.91
A. Shareholders' Relationship to Corporations.
As shown in Table 1, we approached the question of the share-
holder's relationship to his corporation by asking for agreement or dis-
agreement with various statements. Some statements were designed to
address the issue obliquely and some quite directly. The responses of
shareholders and law students were roughly congruent, except for the
responses to statements 1 and 2 (relating to the similarity of owning
stock in a corporation and lending money to one). For statements other
than these two, a majority of shareholders and law students expressed
agreement to at least some degree.
90. The questionnaire was sent to 1,000 persons, living predominantly east of the Rocky
Mountains, whose names appeared on a commercial mailing list of shareholders in public corpo-
rations. By our cut-off date for data-processing, we had received 495 processable replies, and 53
questionnaires which were undeliverable (yielding a return rate of 52%). Of the 495 persons re-
sponding, 466 reported they were currently shareholders in one or more large, publicly-held cor-
porations. The shareholder sample was overwhelmingly male (96.8% males, 1.3% females and
1.9% not answering the question). Their mean age and education were 56.8 years and 16.88 years,
respectively.
91. This sample constituted virtually the entire first-year class, excepting 34 students who
indicated they currently owned stock in one or more large, publicly-held corporations. The non-
shareholder sample was 69% male and 31% female. Their mean age was 23.23 years and they
averaged 16.10 years of education. The questionnaires were completed during a law school class
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For our purposes, statements 3, 5 and 6 are the most important.
The responses clearly indicated acceptance of the proposition that
shareholders should be considered investors rather than owners. Of the
shareholders, 59.5% agreed with a direct wording of that proposition in
statement 5. Obviously, the concepts of "investor" and "owner" are not
mutually exclusive, but it should be noted that statement 5 was phrased
as if they were for the purpose of decision making. The responses to
statement 6 (that buying stock is essentially an investment decision as
opposed to an ownership decision) perhaps provides some basis for un-
derstanding the responses to statement 5. A total of 93.3% of the share-
holders agreed with statement 6, with 57.7% strongly agreeing. More
importantly, statement 3 refines the investor-owner dichotomy by put-
ting it in rather bald terms (that what shareholders essentially own are
their shares, much as what bondholders own are their bonds). Fifty-five
percent of the shareholders agreed with that proposition.
B. Corporate Responsibility to Client-Groups.
We approached the issue of corporate responsibility to client-
groups in two ways. First, we asked respondents to rank-order specified
client-groups according to the responsibility a large, publicly held cor-
poration owes them. Respondents also indicated whether they believed
such a corporation actually owes no responsibility to one or more
groups (other than because of laws such as tax laws, zoning laws, health
and safety laws, and so on). Second, as in the case of the question re-
garding the shareholder's relationship to his corporation, we asked for
agreement or disagreement with certain statements relating to groups
that might be considered in corporate decision making.
Table 2 displays the results of the ranking portion of the survey.
There was a marked general agreement between shareholders and law
students in the order of ranking.92 For both groups of respondents, the
same three client-groups (shareholders, customers and employees) were
ranked in the top three, though in different order. With respect to the
other four client-groups, both shareholders and law students ranked
government last and local community above suppliers.
There were, however, interesting differences between the share-
holders' and the law students' responses. Compared to the range of the
median rankings of the shareholders (1.28-6.76), the range of rankings
by the law students (2.66-6.53) was less extreme. Comparing the values
in the column headed "Percentage ranking this client-group first"
reveals what is partially responsible for this difference: shareholders ex-
92. The correlation between shareholders' and law students' rankings was equal to .79,
which is statistically significant at the .05 level.
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Table 2
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO CLIENT-GROUPS:
GROUP RANKING
Rank Percentage Percentage Percentage indi-
ranking this ranking this cating no re-
client-group client-group sponsibility to
mean median first in top three this client-group
Shareholders
Shareholders 1.62 1.28 64.2% 94.7% 0.0%
Customers 2.26 2.25 28.8 91.5 0.0
Employees 2.51 2.40 3.5 93.1 0.0
Local community 4.56 4.54 0.0 7.9 1.3
Suppliers 5.22 5.25 0.2 3.5 5.3
Society in general 5.28 5.55 3.5 9.0 5.5
Government 6.53 6.76 0.0 0.7 19.1
Law Students
Customers 2.82 2.66 19.0% 73.3% 0.0%
Employees 2.90 2.71 12.1 66.4 0.0
Shareholders 3.22 2.89 26.7 59.4 0.0
Society in general 3.46 3.23 34.5 53.4 0.9
Local community 3.78 3.87 6.9 37.1 0.0
Suppliers 5.71 5.94 0.0 6.1 1.7
Government 6.12 6.53 0.9 4.3 6.9
Note: Ranking was on a scale of I (most responsibility owed by large, publicly-held
corporations) to 7 (least responsibility owed by such corporations). Also, respondents could
indicate they believe a large, publicly-held corporation owes no responsibility to one or more of
the groups (other than because of tax laws, zoning laws, health and safety laws and so on).
pressed a clear first place choice in the rankings (64.2% placed
shareholders first) whereas law students did not (their first place choice
received only 19% of the first place indications and their fourth place
choice received the greatest percentage of first place indications). This
result is of course not surprising, since present shareholders who have
an investment at stake would want to be considered first by the corpo-
ration in its decision making. Finally, with the shareholders, there was
a clear "breaking point" after the first three groups with respect to all
indicators, suggesting a greatly diminishing concern for the interests of
client-groups below that point. Notice, for example, the relatively large
drop in average rankings between employees and local community
(2.51 to 4.56 for the means and 2.40 to 4.54 for the medians). Notice
also, in the column headed '"Percentage ranking this client-group in top
three," the precipitous drop between the percentages for employees
(93.1%) and local community (7.9%). The law students' responses also
displayed a fairly clear breaking point, but it occurred lower in the
rankings: between local community (ranked fifth) and suppliers
(ranked sixth).
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Perhaps most enlightening were the responses of shareholders and
law students when given the opportunity to indicate that corporations
owe no responsibility to one or more of these groups (other than be-
cause of certain types of laws). No shareholder or law student chose to
indicate "no corporate responsibility" toward shareholders, customers
or employees. With respect to the other groups, government, at 19.1%,
received the greatest percentage of either shareholders or law students
indicating no responsibility. As in the case of other indicators of break-
ing points between groups, responses to this portion of the survey re-
vealed a breaking point for the shareholders after the first three groups
and for the law students after the fifth group.
The validity of the present study is somewhat borne out by a study
published in 1977 by Brenner and Molander.93 They surveyed readers
of the Harvard Business Review, mostly business managers, 94 with re-
spect to various corporate responsibility issues. In their study they in-
cluded a client-group ranking section virtually identical to ours. On the






society in general 4.97
suppliers 5.10
government 5.72
These rankings displayed a general congruence with those of share-
holders and law students: the same client-groups were ranked in the top
three by each group of respondents, government was ranked last and
local community was ranked before suppliers. Again, there was a clear
breaking point between client-groups (at the same point as in the share-
holder survey), suggesting that after the third-ranked group there was a
greatly reduced concern for client-group interests.
93. Brenner & Molander, Is the ethics ofbusiness changing?, HARV. Bus. REv. 57 (Jan.-Feb.
1977).
94. Of 5,000 readers polled, 1,227 responded (a return rate of 25%). Seventy-six percent of
these respondents were managers in some form of organization (including some non-corpora-
tions). The non-manager respondents were primarily employed in business in staff positions or
were professional persons. The survey respondents were 94% male. Thirty percent had college
degrees and 60% had attended graduate school. An average age was not reported, but 37% were




The results of the second part of the corporate responsibility por-
tion of our survey are shown in Table 3. In this portion of the survey,
the shareholders and law students displayed the greatest agreement.
Not only are the levels of general agreement relatively close (88.5% and
94.0% for statement 1 and 97.0% and 91.3% for statement 2), but the
percentages of shareholders and law students at each level of agree-
ment are similar. Some differing responses by shareholders and law
students to the two statements, however, raise interesting questions.
Why, for example, are the average responses to the two statements vir-
tually identical for law students and quite different for shareholders?96
We surmise that shareholders had greater sophistication and discerned
differences in the statements that law students missed. Why, also, did
the shareholders exhibit a higher level of strong agreement with the
second statement than with the first (75.1% for the second statement as
opposed to 41.3% for the first).97 Several possible explanations are: (1)
the first statement was specifio-it related to moving a plant-and
therefore gave shareholders details to disagree with; (2) the problems
caused by the moving of a plant are not uncommon, and many share-
holders may have developed conflicts on an issue with which they fun-
damentally agree; and (3) suppliers and people in the local community
were named as client-groups in the second statement, and these groups
ranked low in the shareholders' group rankings. But, whatever the rea-
sons for these differences, the most important result of this portion of
the survey is unambiguous: shareholders strongly agree that in making
corporate decisions, the interests of client-groups other than sharehold-
ers should be considered.
IV. CONCLUSION: NEW GUIDELINES FOR MANAGEMENT
In light of the results of the above research, the authors believe
that the traditional conceptualization of the shareholder's relationship
to the corporation is faulty insofar as it gives shareholders, because
they are "owners," special consideration in management decision mak-
ing affecting other client-groups. In actuality, shareholders expect to be
treated as "investors," much like bondholders for example, and expect
corporate managers to consider a wide constituency when making cor-
porate decisions.98 Their expectations should be met.
96. The difference for the shareholders was statistically significant beyond the .001 level
(Z=-9.52), while for the law students the difference was, of course, not significant (Z=0.0).
97. A Z-test on the significance of the difference between proportions revealed that the dif-
ference was significant beyond the .001 level (Z=10.18).
98. It should be noted that we are referring to non-institutional shareholders and to what
they expect generally-not to what they might hope would be the case in situations where their
own money is at stake. It is the expectations of noninstitutional shareholders that are important to
consider, since in the final analysis real people are behind all institutional investors, either as
shareholders or as some other beneficiary. Also, the expectations of shareholders in situations of
personal involvement are not nearly as relevant for this discussion as are their general expecta-
tions. When their own money is involved, shareholders may feel quite differently.
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Toward meeting these expectations, corporate managers should be
required--either by statute or case law-to consider all of the corpora-
tion's client-groups when making decisions. The list of client-groups
used in the questionnaire is of course not complete, nor was it intended
to be. The authors suggest that it be left to each corporation's managers
to determine the relevant client-groups of their corporation. This task
would not be overly difficult if fairly broad categories (such as those
used in the questionnaire's list) are employed. It should also be left to
each corporation's managers to balance the interests of each client-
group. Clearly no one could legislate a group ranking, or interest-
weighing formulation, that would be generally usable, and studies such
as the one discussed in this Article can only be used to gain insights,
and not answers, to the question of which groups should be considered
in a particular situation.
The general congruence between shareholders', law students' and
managers' rankings in our and Brenner and Molander's surveys does
provide some helpful insight into which groups might reasonably be
expected to rank high or low on corporate managers' lists. It seems
clear, for example, that shareholders, customers and employees could
be expected to rank high and government low (perhaps because the
concept of "government" is not very meaningful in this context). Also,
one could expect no major changes in corporate decision making with
respect to employees because of the existence of the collective bargain-
ing process.
With respect to shareholders, it must be remembered that what
mainly interests them is the market price of their shares. This is affected
in the long run primarily, though by no means exclusively, through
profits. And in the long run (which managers should be free to consider
more important in decision making than the short run), reasonable
profits are absolutely necessary to the interests of all client-groups.
Shareholders would therefore not be slighted in corporate decision-
making since any required balancing of interests must ultimately allow
for reasonable profits. The authors will leave to others the discussion of
what profits are "reasonable." For purposes of this Article, the authors
recognize that to be reasonable to shareholders, profits must be accept-
able to the investment community. The profits must be viewed in the
stock market as "good," "solid," "increasing" and so on. It should be
remembered in this connection that concepts such as these are relative.
Assuming managers of all corporations are forced to abide by the same
corporate responsibility rules, then the fact that one corporation's prof-
its may be less than they otherwise might be because of the balancing
of client-group interests would be of little consequence--other corpora-
tions' profits would probably also be less.
[Vol. 1978:819
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Even if the concept of reasonable profits is left aside for the mo-
ment, the question arises as to how much profit should be "spent" on
balancing client-group interests. Considering the importance of profits
to each client-group, very little should be spent. This can perhaps best
be discussed in connection with balancing the interests of customers
and shareholders. Let us assume management is faced with the follow-
ing situation: rising costs force either a decrease in product quality or
an increase in price, if profits are to reach a certain desired level. As is
not unlikely, we will assume this level is one several cents a share above
last year's profit level (so as to keep profits growing). We will also as-
sume that management has decided that the comparative prices of
competing products are such that the cost cannot be passed on to cus-
tomers. If the per share decrease in profit would be relatively minor
and would still allow growing profits, it would be reasonable for the
corporate managers to be able to say, "Our customers deserve our pres-
ent quality product, and they are going to get it." If, however, the profit
short-fall would eliminate or substantially decrease the hoped-for rise
in profits, it would be most reasonable for management to take the
steps necessary to protect the profits.
The willingness to grant rights to client-groups implies the willing-
ness to give the means to enforce these rights. The authors propose,
therefore, that client-groups be allowed to bring class-action or deriva-
tive suits against corporations for the failure by corporate management
to balance their interests. At first this may seem likely to lead to a mul-
titude of lawsuits, each involving large expenditures of corporate
money and management time and each ultimately being decided by a
judge or jury substituting its own brand of balancing for that of the
corporate managers. Such is not the case. The business judgment rule,
in its present form, should serve as an almost absolute bar to the win-
ning of (and in most cases to the bringing of) this kind of suit, except in
the most egregious cases (ie., those involving the absence of a good
faith attempt either to identify client-groups to be considered in deci-
sion-making, or to balance their interests).99 If any weakness in that
rule becomes apparent in this context, that rule should be strengthened
so as effectively to bar suit in all but the most egregious cases.1°°
Will management willingly accept the proposed new rules? Any
management prepared to act in good faith would have no reason to fear
lawsuits. But more importantly, we wonder if the new rules would in
most cases do anything more than allow corporate managers to be hon-
99. For a good short statement of the rule, and a voluminous collection of authority, see H.
HENN, supra note 4, at 482.
100. See Manning, supra note 83, at 1491.
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est with themselves and the world regarding the reasons for their deci-
sions. While there is no shortage of rhetoric by corporate managers
regarding corporate responsibility, these managers usually seem to feel
the need to explain that socially responsible behavior is in the corpora-
tion's interest (presumably, that socially responsible behavior will
yield profits, at least in the long run).' 0 ' Although this is often true, it is
not always so; sometimes decisions made in favor of client-group inter-
ests cost something in terms of profitability. The Brennner and Mo-
lander study, if accurate, suggests that managers are presently
considering client-groups other than shareholders in their decision
making. The authors believe it desirable for managers to be free to say
so; candor about corporate decisions is in everyone's interests, includ-
ing those of shareholders. Managers might therefore welcome these
proposed changes-though they may not feel able to admit it publicly.
The question also arises as to how radical a change is being pro-
posed. James J. Kilpatrick, a man few would describe as radical, has
said recently:
Somewhere in this broad land a few corporate relics of the 19th
Century may still be operating in the pattern of the public be
damned; a few molding tycoons may still be wedded to concepts of
the sweat shop, child labor, foul pollution, and to grinding the faces
of the poor.
The far more typical corporation has an entire department of
public relations. It has advertising agencies, personnel specialists,
recreation consultants, community advisers, cafeteria managers, the
whole nine yards. The typical corporation has a budget for philan-
throp, for fine art, for gardens, for guided tours, for tea and crum-
pets.
While we wonder if Kilpatrick missed the mark by including advertis-
ing agencies and public relations departments in his list, he raised the
101. General Motors' Chairman, Thomas A. Murphy, has said, for example:
General Motors recognizes the obligation that it has to respond to the changing require-
ments of our society and the increased expectations which society has for the business
community. We also realize that we do business in a world of finite resources and that
the long-ran viability of our Company depends, in the final analysis, on our ability to
adapt to rapidly changing conditions.
1976 General Motors Public Interest Report, inside cover.
Walter A. Haas, Chairman of Levi Strauss & Co., echoes this theme:
We believe that a corporation must become actively involved in facing and solving the
social problems of America. Today's corporation must develop practical means of giving
human needs the same status as profit and production. . . . In the long run, this new
task of the corporation will be in its own best interest; since it cannot prosper as fully or
as long in a society frustrated by social ills and upheaval.
Statement of J. Kreps Before the State, Justice, Commerce and Judiciary Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations 3 (Jan. 23, 1978).
102. Washington Star, Feb. 4, 1978, at A-I1, col. 4-8.
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important issue of corporate philanthropy. A.P. Smith and the cases
that have followed it,10 3 along with the widely adopted statutory provi-
sions allowing charitable contributions by corporations,"° have clearly
paved the way for the changes suggested by this Article. It would be no
revolutionary act for courts or legislatures to do away with whatever
vestiges may remain of the corporate benefit rule as it relates to charita-
ble contributions010 and to extend the basic doctrine of A.P. Smith to
bring client-groups, other than shareholders, within the area of legiti-
mate management concern.
103. See text accompanying notes 49-56 supra.
104. See statutes cited at notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
105. See text accompanying notes 50-64 supra.

